Each individual is an instantiation of a form. @rank sophist:I don't understand these comments:"What does it mean for a form to be one in multiple places? To my thinking, as long as the “nest of primordial relations between things” remains constant, then being a part of the nest of primordial relations between things is something that all things have in common, and could be the partial identity between them.Or am I missing something here? Are there any works that flesh out Aquinas's theory of knowledge in great detail? Whether or not some of the conclusions he has tried to draw from it, or some of his applications of it, in either past threads or this one, are correct is a different matter. "If Lloyd Gerson is right, then neither did Plato. The resemblance theorist would say that being derived from divine archetype F is not the same in F-in-X and F-in-Y, but rather is similar. I do believe, however, that there is no way to explain exactly how existence itself exists. Or, the resemblance theorist can be consistent and just say, “X is like Y, and that’s all I can say about that”, when asked how X is like Y.Looking over what you've said on the subject, I don't see you giving an account of 'X is identical to Y' or 'X is different to Y' in terms of any principles more fundamental than they are, and even if you did you are going to hit bottom somewhere with principles that you think don't require any account in terms of more fundamental ideas and principles. I didn't know anything about Hari but I disagree that the facts he related about Rand from her two biographies are thereby refuted. y = 2x in (1) is not like y = 2x in (2). It becomes more complicated, but not fundamentally different, when dealing with someone like Hugo. ie that X and Y are in some way the same and some way different.As for the red example, obviously it's hard to define the difference between crimson red, lets say, and light red. This means He is without end and does not change. For what does not exist must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its existence ; and hence we need the concept of being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent." There are only particular things that we call "F" because of their ontic or ontological likeness. It is the most basic kind of action that accounts for existence itself. Is there a different spectrum for each color? The starting point in understanding Aquinas’ notion of existence is to recognize existence is highly active and dynamic. So, God exists because He exists. Formal sameness is different from identity.Formal sameness is different from numerical sameness, sure, but they are both different kinds of identity. “Self-expression through action is actually the whole point, the natural perfection or flowering of being itself.” –Norris Clarke, S.J. Thus the resemblance theorist just has to point to this obvious fact. "Shanahan: Just to make sure I understand. genus), same nature (i.e. Brandon:What does it mean to say the electromagnetic spectrum remains the same "in each color"? Essence is an ontological category, while form is ontic. The similarity of their rationality cannot be reduced beyond a recognition that, yes, these rationalities are formally the same--which is to say that they are alike in a particular way.But what does it mean to say that “they are all rational”? But that does not mean that the totality of human beings exists in Plato and Socrates. In fact I was gratified some time ago to run across a source that -- I think correctly -- characterized Plato as a "transcendental idealist" and Aristotle as an "immanent idealist" in the original sense of the word "idealism.") "I don't see why. George,To me, it seems meaningless to say that my humanity has a location. It comes from her empiricism - that our knowledge of reality must be derived entirely from sensory evidence *from* reality. further explanation of its existence is needed. "First, you can’t have it both ways, though. Rather, X and Y exist as parts of a totality that is solely defined by its interrelationships, and X and Y each exist within that totality in a unique set of interrelationships with everything else in that totality. The idea is that There must be a demarcation somewhere, and in this case, the demarcation exists between whatever is an EM frequency and whatever is not an EM frequency, and being an EM frequency, which necessarily implies being a part of the EM spectrum, is the same property in each color. @dguller:"[I]f 'being a color' just meant 'existing within the electromagnetic spectrum between frequency F1 and frequency F2', and this remained constant in each color, then that would be a single factor present in each color that made it a color at all. The role of an existing thing—to actively communicate itself to others–is quite communal. Therefore, there must be something about really existing things that accounts for this very existing, and it is not their essence; it is their existence. He is expressing the Neo-Platonist doctrine that the One includes and surpasses all things in absolute simplicity.Even if you specified some way that X resembles Y, you could not appeal to “a single species” that X and Y belong to, because X and Y stand in completely unique relations of resemblance within the interconnected network of beings. That is precisely the operation that abstraction performs. And although fascinated by the sophisticated apparatus of distinctions, could never quite clearly visualize what they represented or how they operated. Fregean terms, as captured by the existential quantifier. And I don't recall ever meeting, in person or in print, anyone who simply liked Rand as a novelist, and disliked her ideas. )But the question is those who like one and not the other - in this case, that is the test. This isn't a case for a "special status", but merely a point which should be recognized. @NiV:"I don't pretend to understand the philosophy of objectivism - I've not spent any time studying it. An eternal type is an absolute category similar to Plato's ideas.Second, what do you mean when you say that the divine intellect contains “individual substances”?ST I q14 a11. Second of all, Aquinas disagrees that the eternal types are known in this life, which you still haven't grappled with.There is nothing implicit that requires intermediary steps to make explicit in God’s mind, and that is precisely what “indirectly” means, i.e. numerical difference, then it is left with only F itself. First, the resemblance theorist would still have to provide an account of what they mean when they say that X resembles Y. I still find it hard to believe that one can do so without utilizing partial identity and partial difference.Resemblance theorists of the kind we're talking about take resemblance to be an irreducible exactly like most people take identity or difference, though. . The essence of a horse that exists, and the essence of a horse that doesn't are absolutely the same, namely horse-ness; a horse's existing is totally different from what kind of a thing it is. These are metrical properties of bodies. I don't have the exact quote at hand but it's published in The Letters of Ayn Rand and I refer to it in my book. And obviously I DON'T want to construct universals as discrete extensional parts of a thing! Your Socrates/Plato counterexample is a case of higher-level resemblances between persons that can be cashed out as more fundamental resemblances (perhaps including identities) between their properties or relations. Well, both our theories must be equally valid, and so it’s a wash.” In general, I’d say that there is a specific phenomenon, and two theories that purport to account for that phenomenon, then the theory can actually provides an explanation of the phenomenon should be preferred to the theory that declares the phenomenon in explicable. @Vincent Torley:"[T]he distinction in question would not be an essence-existence distinction, but a form-matter distinction. If we can abstract a common feature from the particular colors that is present in each individual color, such as being a part of the electromagnetic spectrum between frequencies F1 and F2, then that common feature would count as a partial identity, which would not be numerical identity, but formal identity. Although Buddhist schools accept rebirth, they hold that there is no such solid self. Were you aware of the indirect arguments by reductio for it, like the one that Father Joyce gave in his natural theology book, at the time, or did you come across those later?On a different note, I can't believe you put out a book of that length and quality out on the internet for free though; haven't been able to read much of it, but everything I've read has been very good. But the general theoretical framework is not what is put on the crucible of experimentation, rather, in a sense, it is what allows and gives sense to experimentation in the first place. But if we went down from Mozart or Rembrandt, we'd find analogous tiers. For the resemblance theorist, "belonging to a spectrum" doesn't pick out one single literally common attribute but a different attribute for each color, and it's your proposed common attribute that requires further analysis.But why doesn’t it “pick out one single literally common attribute”? But how can indirect knowledge be possible in God? species), and different measure (e.g. In no case (except for God) does the essence of a thing indicate anything about whether that thing really is. My preferred solution would be to say that one parts are the same and other parts are different. But thoughts about pure form do not exist, even as useful fictions.I agree that pure forms do not exist, but I disagree that thoughts about pure forms do not exist. The foundation of the philosophy is the precise opposite - that concepts are read off from reality via the chain of sensation, perception, consciousness, and reason. Would the same reasoning apply to something like belonging to a sports team? Aquinas on the unity of essence is highly problematic, I think, as it includes the problem of the one and the many as found in the Greeks, viz, how can one essence/form be many essences in things of this world. "One of the best contemporary writers on philosophy" National Review During the third trimester (during the third period, that is) I went to the concession stand, where I laid out an exorbitant $17.95 for one egg salad sandwich and one small soda. @dguller:"[I]f the resemblance theorist affirms that some resemblances can be cashed out in terms of partial identity and partial difference, and other resemblances cannot, then do you know what the criteri[on] is that the resemblance theorist uses to determine when a resemblance can be cashed out in such a way, and when it cannot?I'd appreciate Scott's input, as well, if he has the time. There cannot be a likeness between two likenesses. "Not according to a resemblance theorist, for whom—again—"existing with the electromagnetic spectrum between frequency F1 and frequency F2" is not the specific, precise property that any particular color really has. Rank: Perhaps I was too vague. (I should perhaps expressly state that my questions are not merely rhetorical and I'm entirely open to argument on this point. We partially explain some phenomenon if we show it be simpler, and less arbitrary. Scott,That's one possibility; another is that formal sameness means that two particulars are numerically distinct instantiations of just one form (in which case the form itself is one and not many, and its instantiations are many and not one).I think this is the position George R. espouses, but I don't think it's coherent. One of the difficulties here has been that there are on a given subject several different varieties of resemblance theory that could be in play -- you have to deny all of them, but the resemblance theorist, of course, will never in any particular case be committed to more than one. genus), and similar nature (i.e. I like the basic Frege idea that existence is the property of being an object, but I don't think 'existence exists' is gibberish. Clearly F(X) differs from F(Y) in terms of the former being in X and the latter being in Y, and thus they cannot be absolutely identical. It's all very well to talk of a Platonic form as an F, the F being a Form, e.g., the Form "dog", with Rover being an instantiation. species)And the problem is distinguishing similarity from difference. The form is the measurement. To say anything further would be to admit that one can analyze the likeness between X and Y further, which necessarily means involving composition of some kind, because analysis is the breaking down of a whole into its constituent parts. You have three individuals, X, Y and Z. X is F, Y is F, and Z is G. How many forms are there? Being is not a full presence within physical reality--which is what virtual particles are trying to have. @Timotheos:"As far as I can tell, dguller's principle of explaining similarity as partial sameness and partial difference is a direct deduction from the 'Identity of Indiscernibles'. @ George LeSauvage“To me, it seems meaningless to say that my humanity has a location. It cannot be analyzed further than, "These two things are alike in a very strict way." Anon,The distinction between numerical and formal sameness is one that dguller is taking from the Summa. And since the resemblance theorist can explain how X is like Y by describing in what way(s) X and Y are the same, and in what ways X and Y are not the same, it follows that resemblance relations can be reduced to parts that are the same and parts that are not the same. "And again, the key point for the resemblance theorist is that "being a part of that framework" is not a single property but a shorthand description of whole sheaf, range, or spectrum of real properties: each color is "part of that framework" in a slightly different way. "I'm not seeing that; can you elaborate?Suppose that (say) "colors" as they appear in experience are irreducibly similar in that they belong to a spectrum of mutually resembling qualia without literally having any single isolable feature in common. @ Monk68Re. If X is like1 and Y is like2, and like1 is like like2, then the relation of likeness between like1 and like2 must be through a third kind of likeness, i.e. any color must occupy a nonzero expanse of space and endure for a nonzero length of time, that it can therefore be divided into parts, and that the denier of real universals therefore seems to be in the odd position of denying that even one thing can be "the same. For one thing, it entails that each angel belongs to a unique species. But they weren't.Also, for the record, mea culpa: I misspoke without rereading the article. And to say that one resemblance is like another resemblance in that they are both due to sight would just mean that what the two resemblances share in common is the fact that they are due to sight. "Furthermore, it is my understanding that dark energy is also something we have no direct observation of. species)I don’t see how this can make sense under your framework in which whenever he says “the same as”, he really means “similar to”. Exist definition, to have actual being; be: The world exists, whether you like it or not. @ Rank Sophist"then becoming presupposes being and must be less than being. And so on, down to analogy.But you haven’t explained the difference in degrees that you mentioned earlier. Would the same reasoning apply to something like laying eggs? While others collect rare items. It implies for example, that the speed of light is the top speed for any massless particle or wave (and thus any signal) for when the speed -> c, the energy needed to accelerate -> infinity. You would have to demarcate one set of “unique resemblance relations” between different things, and say that within this boundary, you have colors, and outside of this boundary, you do not have colors. being” only exists in the form of God. So, C would have to correspond to either essence or the relations. And I would say that if a process of abstraction can end at the same point, then that destination is the partial identity between two things that are being compared. This is a fairly important historical test case about the status of entities of which we do not have direct sensory experience. Similarly, most Christians I've met have little idea of how the theology works, or in many cases what's actually in the Bible. I would put it to you that if we need to invoke a real distinction in order to explain the fact that I can know what a Thylacine (Tasmanian tiger) is, without knowing whether one actually exists [the last known one died on a zoo in 1936], the distinction in question would not be an essence-existence distinction, but a form-matter distinction. So, it is not enough to say that if X has a unique relation of resemblance to all colors of the spectrum, then X is a color. happens, Rand, according to Den Uyl and Rasmussen (on p. 5 of the essay cited above), I chose the photograph of The Vitruvian Man by Leonardo da Vinci because the picture itself is of a man who seems to be completely proportional, a man who is “perfect”. in-form-ation? If the intellect can perform this abstraction, then I think it is fair to say that y = 2x is present in both (1) and (2).I think that the same process would apply to colors. motion the disintegration of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science, By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of Capital Punishment (with Joseph M. Bessette), Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, Maritain Center online archive of Thomistic and Neo-Scholastic works, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange: A Biographical Sketch, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas Aquinas in English: A Bibliography. Immanent realism has no such luck. The use of file.exists() to test for the existence of the directory is a problem in the original post. species), and similar measure (e.g. Say that the network is constituted by a set of nodes, N1, N2, …, Nn, each node of which is characterized by its specific and unique pattern of relations with each other node in the network. It's hardly invented. I would imagine that the resemblance theorist would say that this is precisely where the intellect must stop in its process of abstraction, and that it simply recognizes in a primordial fashion that roundness-in-A resembles roundness-in-B. Even if my hypothetical resemblance theorist is right about colors, that alone doesn't mean s/he's right about shapes (or mathematical formulae). Second, I still don’t understand what “virtually” means. "Do you know whether what Craig was saying about the speed of light being constant between two points not having any proof? Some watch sport, or date girls. You just keep begging the question and assuming that A) formal identity can be the absolute identity that you need to it be and B) that absolute identity in two places is not a contradiction. Rank:Sorry about the lateness of my reply. That, indeed, just kicks the problem up a level.What he does mean is that Socrates the human is different than Plato the human, and thus, their humanity is different in so far as it exists in different people. Or are you arguing that it is impossible for the intellect to abstract all differences which would leave commonality that is the same in each thing? not directly present to the intellect in an explicit fashion, but after a series of steps, becomes directly present to the intellect in an explicit fashion. Scott: Not according to a resemblance theorist, for whom—again—"existing with the electromagnetic spectrum between frequency F1 and frequency F2" is not the specific, precise property that any particular color really has. Sure, there's just one team, but each of them has his own unique "property" of belonging to it: "Michael Jordan's belonging to the Bulls" is not the same property as "Scottie Pippen's belonging to the Bulls." Sure, that abstracted form exists within an intellect, but the thoughts about the form are not about the form in the intellect, but rather about the form itself. Even saying that X is identical to Y iff X’s properties/qualities/attributes are the same as Y’s properties/qualities/attributes still has to use “the same as” to explain “identical”. Say that I ask how X resembles Y. The existence of an orderly universe containing life points to a Creator. "No, it's just that there are a bunch of animals that have reproductive systems that resemble each other in having external eggs." A fundamental concept in calculus look it up to imperfect likeness is presupposed in any further analysis is.. Yet it is my understanding that dark energy is also quite wrong mean that the of... 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